Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) are renewable electricity (RES-E) subsidy mechanisms in which governments mandate how much RES-E should be generated and markets determine the cost of the subsidy needed to generate the RES-E. Two modifications of the RPS that can help support high-cost types of RES-E are banding, where governments mandate higher multiples of RPS tradable certificates for high-cost types of RES-E, and carve-outs, where governments prescribe a part of an RPS target that can be met only by a particular type, or types, of RES-E. This paper analyses the design and generation performance of banding, as used in the UK, with some reference to Italy; and carve-outs, as used in the USA.
Introduction
Renewable electricity (RES-E) is assuming increasing policy importance around the world because it is considered a significant means by which greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced (Mendonca et al., 2010) . However, RES-E currently generally costs more to generate than electricity generated by fossil fuels without a carbon price (although this can depend on the technology in question and the site where RES-E is located). Several different support mechanisms have evolved that subsidise RES-E so that it can overcome its generation cost disadvantage with fossil fuel generated electricity. Two of the most popular use subsidies financed by electricity consumers. They are: Feed-in Tariffs (FITs), in which governments mandate a level of subsidy and markets determine how much RES-E is generated;
and Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs), in which governments mandate how much RES-E is generated and markets determine the price it is to generated for (either through the spot market trade of RES-E generation certificates or through contracted certificate trade) (Finon, 2006) . FITs are generally differentiated  and therefore pay a different subsidy per unit of generation of different types of RES-E (ie wind, solar, biomass etc)  whereas RPSs are generally not differentiated and pay the same subsidy regardless of RES-E type.
Because RPSs are generally undifferentiated, they support low-cost types of RES-E and give no incentive for high-cost types of RES-E to be purchased.
However, as the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions assumes increasing importance, the RPS mechanism is being called upon to support the full range of RES-E types, including high-cost types. This is because high-cost RES-E types often have significant generating potential which will need to be developed if a large proportion of a country's electricity is to be generated by RES-E. Examples are offshore wind in the United Kingdom and solar in Australia (Secretary for Energy and Climate Change, 2009, p. 44; Garnaut, 2008, p. 486) . This article discusses and analyses two RPS design devices that can allow this to happen: banding and carve-outs. Banding is a device in which different multiples of tradable certificates are issued for each unit of generation depending on the type of RES-E.
Carve-outs are parts of an RPS market that are reserved for particular RES-E types: they are, effectively, RPS submarkets.
Several authors have compared the RPS mechanism to the FIT one (Mitchell et al., 2006; Butler and Neuhoff, 2004; Toke, 2005) while others have analysed a country, or group of countries, that use RPS mechanisms (Van der Linden et al, 2005; Kaberger et al., 2007) . Others, still, have considered particular aspects of RPS design (Agnolucci, 2007; Kildegaard, 2008) . However, none have compared the effectiveness of banding and carve-outs.
Section two of this paper discusses the evolution, and global use, of the RPS mechanism; section three discusses the strengths and weaknesses of an undifferentiated RPS. Section four analyses the use of banding in the United Kingdom and Italy while section five analyses the use of carve-outs in the United States of America. Section six compares the strengths and weaknesses of banding and carve-outs, and section seven concludes.
History and use of the RPS
The RPS was originally developed in the USA in the late 1990s: about ten years after the FIT was established. As shown in Table 1 , the RPS is less extensively used around the world than the FIT, especially at a national level. The RPS is popular in North America while the FIT is extensively used in Europe.
Neither the RPS, nor the FIT, is widely used outside those two continents although there is limited use of both in Asia and some use of the FIT in Africa and Central/South America.
Compulsory RPS mechanisms have been adopted by half of the states in the USA as well as by the District of Columbia. They have also been adopted by three of the 13 provinces and territories of Canada; are deployed in Belgium, Italy, Sweden, the UK, Romania and Poland; are used in Japan, Thailand and Australia;
and have been used in six states in India. The RPS mechanism generally involves an obligation on electricity retailers to purchase a government pre-determined proportion of their sales as RES-E, either directly from RES-E generators via contracts, or indirectly via RES-E open market tradable certificate sales (which typically represent one megawatt-hour of RES-E generation). The organisation that did the most to develop the RPS was the American Wind Energy Association (AWEA). It wanted a mechanism that was compatible with deregulated electricity markets. It also wanted a mechanism that would be acceptable to the US Congress which, in the late 1990s, was dominated by the Republican Party. The FIT was not considered politically acceptable in the USA at the time. The 1995 commencement of trading of sulphur-dioxide emission licenses under quantity-based rules enshrined in the nation's Clean Air Act  the predecessor of greenhouse gas emissions trading widely viewed in the US as a costeffective way of reducing sulphur-dioxide emissions  also influenced the US renewable energy political landscape of the time (Wood, 2007, p. 2) . The AWEA official most credited with developing the mechanism, Nancy Rader, argued that 'the flexible, market-based implementation of the standard would ensure achievement of policy goals at least cost' (Rader and Norgaard, 1996, p. 44) .
Strengths and weaknesses of an RPS
Particularly when compared to the FIT, the big advantage of an RPS mechanism is its theoretical ability to contain RES-E subsidy costs. This is achieved through its dictation of the quantity of RES-E that is to provided, as well as through its incentive to source least-cost types of RES-E. Menanteau et al (2003, p. 810) argue that quantity based systems like an RPS give governments direct control over the amount of installed RES-E capacity and, therefore indirectly, over the marginal cost of RES-E production. Finon (2006, p. 331) similarly argues that one of the strengths of an RPS is the possibility it provides for the control of collective subsidy costs. This theoretical ability to contain subsidy costs means that RPS mechanisms have a high static efficiency: the ability to contain short-term costs without regard for longer term cost consequences. It is also argued that the use of non-compliance penalties  fees imposed when electricity retailers do not purchase the required amount of RES-E  further enhance the static efficiency advantage of an RPS (Finon, 2006, p. 331) . Other theoretical strengths of an RPS include the fact that through allowing all RES-E generators, and all electricity retailers, to buy and sell into the same market they are better than FITs at allocating marginal generation costs across a market (Menanteau et al, 2003, p. 803) . A further theoretical strength is that, because the RPS is a mechanism that assumes a separation between RES-E production and consumption, is better suited to unbundled liberalised electricity markets where generators and distributors are not vertically integrated (Finon, 2006, p. 328; Menanteau et al, 2003, p. 809 ).
However, the theoretical strengths of an RPS are challenged by many commentators. While the RPS may have a theoretical cost containment/static efficiency advantage over an FIT, many argue this advantage is more than outweighed by the risk premium that RES-E generators demand in an RPS market.
The risk premium is a product of RPS tradable certificates trading for uncertain, and potentially volatile, prices which reduces the ability of an RES-E investor to attract loan finance which they compensate for by selling generation certificates at a premium (Menanteau et al, 2003, p. 810; Finon, 2006, p. 332) . The existence of this risk premium led Butler and Neuhoff (2004, p. 13 ) to conclude that, over the lifetime of a wind generator, the resource adjusted cost of the FIT subsidy it attracted in Germany was less than the equivalent RPS subsidy extended to a generator in the UK. Toke (2005, p. 30 ) also concluded that there was no evidence that the UK RPS supplies RES-E less expensively than an FIT. Similarly, Mitchell et al (2006, p. 304) argued that, although FITs and RPSs had similar volume risks, RPSs had higher price risks.
A second major criticism of the RPS holds that because it only incentivises least-cost RES-E, it lacks dynamic efficiency: the reduction of long-run marginal costs through the development of less mature RES-E types (Finon, 2006, p. 318; Menanteau et al, 2003, p. 805; Jaffe et al., 2005) . As shown in Table 2 , the generating costs of solar photovoltaic, solar thermal and offshore wind are currently much higher than those of onshore wind and biomass using steam, so any mechanism, like an RPS, that is focused on the subsidisation of least-cost RES-E types will not provide much support to them. This criticism of the RPS is sometimes extended through an argument that says that not only does the RPS only incentivise least-cost RES-E, but because, in undifferentiated form, it provides a homogeneous subsidy to all types of RES-E, it tends to oversubsidise mature, least-cost types of RES-E whilst undersubsidising less mature, high-cost types of RES-E (Toke, 2007, p. 283) . 
The use of banding in the United Kingdom and Italy
Examination of the experience of banding in particular countries is instructive; two countries that have attempted to make significant use of the device are the United Kingdom and Italy.
The use of banding in the United Kingdom
The country that has most enthusiastically embraced RPS banding is the United Kingdom. After extensive public consultation, in April 2009 it introduced the banding tradable certificate multipliers shown in Table 3 (although, when originally announced, the offshore wind multiplier was 1.5, not 2). In April 2010 it also introduced an FIT for small scaled RES-E generation of less than 5 MW capacity (which cannot also be subsidised through the RPS). As shown in The UK banding rates were mainly based on short and medium term RES-E generating costs calculated by Ernst and Young (2007 Change, 2008, pp. 17 -20) .
Under an RPS, RES-E generators derive their income from two sources: the wholesale price of electricity, which all electricity generators receive, and the sale of tradable certificates (by contract or on spot market), that only RES-E generators receive. This means RPS tradable certificates cover the part of RES-E generating costs that is not covered by the wholesale price of electricity. Table 4 The author calculations in Table 4 show that for all non onshore wind types of RES-E, apart from landfill gas, the ratio of its banding rate to that of onshore wind is lower than the ratio of its 2007 (or 2009) net generating cost to onshore wind's.
When it comes to net 2020 generating costs, the ratio of banding rates to onshore wind's is still lower than that of net generating costs for all RES-E types apart from landfill gas and offshore wind. Those two RES-E types are therefore the ones that the UK's banding is most generous to. The poor relationship of the banding rates of the other RES-E types, when compared to net generating costs, especially solar PV's, is probably a product of the UK government wanting to create an ongoing incentive to develop decreasing generating costs for those RES-E types, as well as a possible fear that a high banding rate would make the scheme very costly. It may also reflect a prediction that most solar PV generators, and some generators of the other RES-E types, will elect to be subsidised under a new FIT for generators up to 5 MW in capacity that began in April 2010.
It is clear from Table 4 that the projection of RES-E generating costs by governments is pivotal to the effectiveness of banding. It could be argued that this introduces a significant level of risk into the mechanism and that poor cost projections could make banding impotent, or overly generous, to some RES-E types. However, it has to be remembered that undifferentiated RPS markets are overly generous to some RES-E types whilst not being generous enough to others. Trade and Industry, 2001, p. 26) . This was despite the fact that extensive public consultation, held before its RPS was introduced, supported the introduction of banding Pearson, 2007, p. 1543) . The government's change from an unbanded RPS was largely prompted by its desire to support significantly more wind generation, particularly offshore wind. The UK government has an official RES-E target of a 20% share of all electricity generation by 2020, although it has only set interim targets through to 2015-16 (the target for that year is 15.4%) (Mitchell et al, 2011) . However, as part of a European Union goal of sourcing 20% of all energy use (electricity, heat and transport) from renewable sources by 2020, it is committed to sourcing 15% of all its energy from renewable sources by 2020. In order to comply with this, there is an unofficial aspiration to source 30% of the country's electricity from RES-E by 2020 about 70% of which the government hopes will be generated by wind (both onshore and offshore) and about a third of which it hopes will be generated by offshore wind (Secretary for Energy and Climate Change, 2009, pp. 44, 52) . In 2007 the UK sourced 5.1% of its electricity from RES-E (European Commission, 2010). Table 5 shows the change in the RES-E generation covered by the UK RPS between 2006, when banding was announced, and 2009, the year when it commenced. The largest increases in generation were recorded by offshore wind, onshore wind and biomass. Of these, offshore wind and biomass are the standouts because onshore wind did not receive any increase in tradable certificates per unit of generation under banding. So while there is too little significant data to say definitively say how successful the UK's banding has been at putting the country on a path to achieving its ambitious unofficial 2020 RES-E generation goal, the Table 5 results suggest a credible start has been made. It should be noted that solar PV in the UK during the 2006 to 2009 period was assisted through a government grants program and its RPS was not necessarily the key driver of its increased generation.
Also worthy of note is that co-firing is limited to a maximum of 12.5% of the generation accounted for by the UK's RPS (Mitchell et al, 2011) . indexes are computed using an inverted Herfindahl index: the sum of the squares of the shares of RES-E generation of each RES-E type in a jurisdiction in a given year.
The higher the diversity index, the less concentrated is the overall mix of RES-E types. The RES-E diversity index fell, slightly, in the UK over the period as its RES-E generation became more concentrated around hydro, landfill gas and onshore wind but the index will rise if offshore wind generation continues to increase. The UK's RES-E generation is more diverse than that of Italy, shown in Table 9 , and US carve-out and non carve-out RPS states, shown in Table 14 .
However, its commencing RES-E diversity in 2006-07 was already significantly more diverse than that of US carve-out and non carve-out RPS states in 2003, and
Italy in 2008.
The UK has a complicated non-compliance charge mechanism that, to date, has had a major negative effect on the attainment of its RPS targets that may significantly affect the success of its banding. The country's non-compliance charge was £36.99/MWh in 2009/10. The charge, known as a 'buyout fee', is recycled amongst complying electricity retailers. When combined with the high degree of ownership concentration in the UK electricity industry, it is often argued this recycling gives the industry an incentive to under-invest in new RES-E capacity.
This happens through the highly concentrated UK RES-E generators restricting the supply of RES-E, thereby keeping tradable certificate prices high, which increases the incentive for electricity retailers to pay the buyout fee instead of purchasing tradable certificates. Because buyout fee charges are recycled amongst complying electricity retailers that purchase tradable certificates, and because the retailers are also in many cases RES-E generators, it is argued they have a vested interest in restricting RES-E supply to increase the amount of buyout fee income that comes back to them. When combined with the fact that full attainment of each year's RPS target would have caused the UK tradable certificate price to crash before the guaranteed headroom feature was introduced (discussed below), the recycling phenomenon is often credited with being the driving force behind the low attainment of UK annual RES-E targets, shown in Table 6 . Whether the UK buyout fee is too low or too high depends on whether an electricity generator in the country is also an RES-E generator and it also depends on what type of RES-E is being considered. The combined value of the buyout fee and the amount recycled from the buyout fund acts can act as an RPS tradable certificate price ceiling if set too low, for 2008-09 it was £35.76 + £18.61 = £54.37. If an electricity retailer is also an RES-E generator, then the cost to it of generating wind, as shown in column 1 of Table 4 , is less than this amount and it would be worth the retailer generating this type of RES-E instead of paying the buyout fee. This is also the case if a retailer is not a generator and has to buy RES-E tradable certificates on the open market. As shown in Table 7 , in summer 2010-11, the cost of a UK tradable certificate was £52.20, again less than the effective £54.37 cost of the buyout fee. Similar calculations apply to biomass and offshore wind, after factoring in their multipliers as shown in Table 4 . However, wave and solar PV are more expensive to generate than the effective value of the buyout fee, even after factoring in their multipliers, in which case the retailer would be better off paying the buyout fee, if it was also an RES-E generator. The introduction of banding into the UK's RPS has not been without its critics. Johnston et al (2008 Johnston et al ( , pp. 2492 Johnston et al ( , 2496 argue that banding will create 'regulatory and market uncertainty' which may justify additional risk premiums for RES-E investors. They argue this is because future tradable certificate prices will depend on the degree to which different types of RES-E penetrate the RPS market.
However, a device that the UK government has introduced which should minimise this tradable certificate price uncertainty is 'guaranteed headroom'. This is a set percentage (currently 8%, rising to 10% from 2011) by which the RPS obligation on electricity retailers is increased each year above, and beyond, the number of tradable certificates expected to be created in the year. It ensures that the annual RPS obligation always keeps ahead of the expected level of RES-E generation which should keep an upward pressure on tradable certificate prices (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010a). Typically, a large (but variable) proportion of RES-E sold in an RPS is transacted via contracts between RES-E generators and electricity retailers. However, a significant proportion is typically sold via spot tradable certificate markets which influences contract prices. The presence of headroom does not remove all uncertainty in an RPS tradable certificate market because the amount of the headroom might change and there is no guarantee that it will always be used by the UK government. This means there will always be a justification for some risk premium, however it also has to be remembered that FIT subsidy rates can also be altered and therefore also carry a political risk, as argued by Finon (2006, p. 320 ).
The headroom device provides an implicit tradable certificate price floor but it does not have to be linked to banding, it could just as easily be used in an RPS carve-out market. Some RPS countries have developed explicit RPS tradable certificate price floors; two such countries have been Belgium and Sweden.
Belgium's RPS is divided into three separate sub-national markets each of which has a minimum tradable certificate price below which prices are not allowed to fall (Coenraads et al 2008) . In the case of Sweden, in order to develop early confidence in its RPS, a minimum tradable certificate price guarantee operated for an introductory period between 2003 and 2007 (Wang, 2006) . The use of implicit, or explicit, RPS price floors, along with RPS carve-outs or banding, would give an RPS two of the key features that differentiate an FIT from an RPS: subsidy certainty along with differentiation of subsidy according to RPS type. 
The use of banding in Italy
Another European country that uses the RPS mechanism, Italy, has also incorporated banding. However, as shown in Table 8 , its banding rates are not highly differentiated, apart for wave/tidal and biomass (generators of less than 1 MW capacity have the option of using an FIT for most of the RES-E types listed in Table 14 ).
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that banding is only used in a token way in Italy. (Coenraads et al., 2008, p. 82; Rathmann et al., 2009, p. 138) .
The use of carve-outs in the USA
The most significant use of the RPS carve-out device has occurred in the USA.
The RPS is used by 25 of the 50 states in the USA, as well as by the District of Columbia. Out of the 26 RPS jurisdictions in the country, 11 use carve-outs within the mechanism. Details of the US RPS state carve-outs, as well as of the RPSs they sit within, are given in Table 10 (including Washington DC). As shown in Table 10 , in only four states do any of the carve-outs account for a significant proportion (at least a quarter) of their RPS target: Maine, New
Hampshire, New Mexico and Pennsylvania. Even in those states, the carve-outs are not necessarily used to support high-cost RES-E. The largest Maine and Pennsylvania carve-outs are for fairly amorphous groups of RES-E (or even non-RES-E): new RES-E in Maine, and waste/gasified coal, distributed generation, large hydro and municipal waste in Pennsylvania. In New Mexico (whose carve-outs start in 2011), one of its largest carve-outs is dedicated to wind, which is not a high-cost type of RES-E, and in New Hampshire its largest carve-out is devoted to small/medium biomass (including methane), which is also not a high-cost type of RES-E. This does not mean the carve-outs are superfluous, but it does mean they are not being used to support high-cost RES-E, and therefore to broaden the support of the RPS. In the other seven carve-out states, none has a carve-out for more than a quarter of its RPS target. Most of the As shown in Table 11 , all but two of the US carve-outs commenced in 2005 or later so, like banding in the UK and Italy, it is a relatively recent RPS refinement although it has a slightly longer history than banding in those two countries does. Table 15 , in all cases they are higher than the Unlike the enabling legislation for early, non carve-out RPS mechanisms, the RPS legislation for carve-out states generally emphasised the importance of electricity generation diversity. The legislation for the RPS mechanism of Delaware, New Hampshire and Washington DC, for instance, speaks of the desirability of increased electricity 'supply' or 'fuel' diversity while New Mexico's talks about promoting 'energy self-sufficiency' (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2010). Table 12 shows the RES-E generation performance, between 2003 and 2008, of two of the four states with significant carve-outs: New Hampshire and Pennsylvania. As detailed in Table 10 , New Hampshire's most significant carve-out is for methane and small/medium biomass which Table 12 shows experienced significant growth between 2003 and 2008. New Hampshire also has a less significant carve-out for small hydro which the table also shows experienced significant growth over the period. 
Strengths and weaknesses of banding and carve-outs
The price-based banding device, and the quantity-based carve-out device, have strengths and weaknesses similar to any pair of price-and quantity-based control mechanisms as originally explored by Weitzman (1974) and recently reviewed for carbon pricing by Hepburn (2006) . However, published literature, to date, has given the specific strengths and weaknesses of banding and carve-outs little attention.
The strengths of banding are that its tradable certificate multiplier rates, and generation of particular RES-E types, can be flexible. It is relatively easy to make changes to its certificate multiplier rates (as the UK government did with its offshore wind rate in 2009 before banding commenced) resulting (probably) in different amounts of generation for the RES-E types the changes are applied to.
However, such changes can increase risk, and therefore cost, and can also impact on other RES-E multiplier rates. Another strength of banding is that by retaining a single tradable certificate market, it retains a homogenous certificate market and therefore retains liquidity. A further strength is that it can remove over-subsidisation of low-cost RES-E types (although if carve-outs are created for each RES-E type, it too can achieve this). It can also be argued that governments can use banding multiplier rates to help drive reductions in RES-E generating costs. The great strength of carve-outs is that they deliver (or should deliver) a fairly predictable amount of generation of particular RES-E types (if the size of each carve-out is realistic). Arguably, another strength is that it allows markets to set the differentials between its tradable certificate prices (although governments still determine the size of each carve-out). Its weaknesses are that, by creating a series of separate tradable certificate markets, it reduces the liquidity of the pre-existing homogenised market and, therefore, can be just as complex as banding. It can also be inflexible in the amount of generation it allows of particular RES-E types. A further weakness can be that once RES-E generation nears a carve-out target, the tradable certificate price for the type of RES-E in question can fall, creating a 'boom-bust' environment.
In theory, both the banding tradable certificate multiplier rates, and the size of individual carve-out markets, can be changed as market circumstances evolve, so those two flexibility weaknesses need not be serious for either device (although there is a limit to the frequency of change either can have before eroding RES-E investor confidence). Both also necessarily involve more complexity than undifferentiated, homogenised RPS tradable certificate markets so neither can claim to be inherently less complex than the other.
When it comes to market or government determination of RES-E subsidies, in both cases, markets and governments together determine the total size of their RES-E subsidies. This is because each controls either the per-unit subsidy rate, or the amount of RES-E generation. This means neither can claim to be more market-or government-driven than the other. However, it is important that the government component of each be linked to market realities. There is no point in creating very large carve-outs for RES-E types at embryonic stages of development and it is unwise to set banding multiplier rates that are conspicuously disconnected from the short and medium term generation costs of the RES-E types they are applied to.
As discussed in section 3, a major theoretical strength of the RPS is its ability to contain static costs (Finon, 2006, p. 337; Menanteau, 2003, p. 807) . It could be argued that because carve-outs preserve the one-to-one link between RES-E generation and tradable certificate creation, they retain this quality better than banding does and should, therefore, be able to deliver increased RES-E diversity at less cost than banding. However, if a target for a particular carve-out is set unrealistically high by a government, it will exert an upward force on tradable certificate prices and will not deliver diversity at least cost. This is also the case if a banding rate is made unrealistically generous for a type of RES-E. So both are capable of delivering expensive RES-E diversity if governments design them poorly.
The significance of the reduction in market liquidity caused by carve-outs depends on the size of the pre-existing homogenised certificate market it is applied to (measured as the number of tradable certificates exchanged each year: a product of the RPS target size and the proportion met by open market certificate trading). In some RPS mechanisms, like that of Massachusetts, most generator income is
derived from the open market sale of tradable certificates There is, then, no clear design supremacy in either banding or carve-outs.
However, on balance, the liquidity and generation flexibility strengths of banding probably make it superior to carve-outs, though either is capable of being incorporated into a specific RPS market.
Conclusion
The purpose of the banding and carve-out devices is to introduce different levels of support for different types of RES-E into the RPS mechanism so that highcost types, in particular, receive adequate support. To date, there is insufficient experience, and reliable data, to be able to reach definite conclusions about the effectiveness of either device in fulfilling this although there is ample information about the design differences between the two devices. Banding needs several more years of use in the UK before clear trends are evident. There also needs to be more significant use of carve-outs, in the USA or anywhere else, before any firm conclusions can be reached about its use. However, there is early, tentative evidence that banding is being effective at supporting high-cost offshore wind generation in the UK. There is also some evidence that carve-outs are being somewhat effective in supporting some low-cost types of RES-E in US RPS states but there is little evidence of high-cost RES-E support. In theory, both banding and carve-outs are capable of supporting high-cost RES-E. On balance, however, banding is probably a superior device to carve-outs although either could be incorporated into specific RPS markets.
